In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, when oil prices were in the triple digits, El-Gamal and Jaffe (2013) analyzed the production histories of all major oil producers since 1970. They concluded that regime change, by itself, does not result in supply disruptions, while wars that destroy production infrastructure or obstruct the flow of oil do. Since the regional civil strife of the Arab Spring, global demand growth has been relatively weak due to technical progress and continued global economic sluggishness, and new unconventional oil sources began reaching the market at an accelerating pace. Therefore, they reached the conclusion that oil prices at the time were inflated by excess financial liquidity from central banks, together with a bubble-supporting story concerning Middle East geopolitics.
El-Gamal and Jaffe predicted the following in late 2012: "If the outright war scenario is excluded, we expect prices to fall precipitously in the medium term (three to five years)." They did. The significant catch in this model and story is that the country must engage in just the right level of military conflict, and no more, otherwise the outcome will be much worse than the status quo. This is the great difficulty:
Regimes will come under tremendous economic and political pressure and will be tempted to increase the scope and scale of their military operations in pursuit of petrodollars. However, they must know that wars, by their very nature, are unpredictable. Once war commences, the scope and scale may be increased by other parties, who are not included in this model, well beyond the optimal level for the modeled oil exporter.
Wariness of this well-understood danger notwithstanding, the temptation to escalate will be too strong, and Winter Is Coming!
